Daring as it is to investigate the unknown, even more so it is to question the known. –Kaspar.
Exploring what we think we know can prove fruitful in reinforcing what we thought we knew and in dispelling discontinuities and errors. So, I believe this exercise has been in my case, especially with regard to the issue of Popper’s criteria of falsification. But, that is skipping a bit ahead. In compliance with Carroll, I will “Begin at the beginning,” but not necessarily “go on till [I] come to the end; then stop.” This topic is worthy of a report, if not a dissertation.
Perhaps because the question of “what is science” is a philosophical issue, complex, or, I think more likely, so much taken for granted that there are graduate research texts that do not even index the word (Creswell, 2002, Patton, 2001). Ironically, my copy of the Dictionary of Science (Mandel, 1969) offers no definition of "science."
A useful place to begin is with the history of the word “science.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary (O.E.D.) the etymology of “science” is as follows.
[a. F. science = Pr. sciensa, Sp. ciencia, Pg. sciencia, It. scienza, ad. L. scientia knowledge, f. scient-em, pr. pple. of scre to know.]
The selected O.E.D. definitions below map the evolution of the term “science” and distinguish between general and restricted uses.
“…2. a. Knowledge acquired by study; acquaintance with or mastery of any department of learning. Also pl. (a person's) various kinds of knowledge.
b. Trained skill. Now esp. (somewhat jocularly) with reference to pugilism (cf. 3c); also to horsemanship and other bodily exercises.
3. a. A particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of learning.
In the Middle Ages, ‘the seven (liberal) sciences’ was often used synonymously with ‘the seven liberal arts’, for the group of studies comprised by the Trivium (Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric) and the Quadrivium (Arithmetic, Music, Geometry, Astronomy).
b. Contradistinguished from art: see
4. a. In a more restricted sense: A branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated truths or with observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under general laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain.
b. with defining word. The many conflicting systems proposed in recent times for the classification of the sciences, and the need frequently arising (apart from any formal classification) for a common designation applicable to a group of sciences that are related by similarity of subject or method, have given currency to a large number of expressions in which the word science is qualified by an adj. The application of these collocations, so far as it is not obvious, is explained under the adjs. Among the most prominent of the adjs. designating particular classes of sciences are: abstract, concrete, biological, descriptive, exact, experimental, historical, mathematical, mechanical, moral, mixed, pure, natural, physical. Also with preceding n., as life science, and combined with a prefix, as bio-, geo-, neuroscience. (See under the first element.)
5. a. The kind of knowledge or of intellectual activity of which the various ‘sciences’ are examples. In early use, with reference to sense 3: What is taught in the schools or may be learned by study. In mod. use chiefly: The sciences (in sense 4) as distinguished from other departments of learning; scientific doctrine or investigation. Often with defining adj. as in 4b. In the 17th and 18th c. the notion now usually expressed by science was commonly expressed by philosophy.
b. In modern use, often treated as synonymous with ‘Natural and Physical Science’, and thus restricted to those branches of study that relate to the phenomena of the material universe and their laws, sometimes with implied exclusion of pure mathematics. This is now the dominant sense in ordinary use.”
Encyclopedia Britannica Online notes that, “Taken broadly as the progressive improvement of the understanding of nature, the intellectual enterprise of science originally formed an integral part of philosophy, and the two areas of inquiry have never finally separated. Little more than a hundred years ago, theoretical physics—concerned with the fundamental debate about physical nature—was still described as ‘natural philosophy,’ as distinguished from the two other chief divisions of abstract discussion, viz., moral philosophy and metaphysical philosophy—the latter including ontology, the study of the deepest nature of reality or being. In fact, only during the 20th century, following the professionalization and specialization of the natural sciences, did the philosophy of science become recognized as a separate discipline.”
While the O.E.D. definitions are interesting, they still do not get to the heart of the demarcation issue--what is not science? How does one distinguish between science and non-science? And, is this distinction a matter of perspective? Would a natural scientist disagree with a social scientist about the parameters of scientific inquiry?
The answer to the latter question seems to be “yes.” Maxwell (2004) in writing about qualitative inquiry addresses this very issue:
“The reemergence of a narrowly defined ‘scientifically based research’ that marginalizes qualitative approaches represents a major threat to qualitative research. A postmodern perspective not only challenges this essentialist definition of ‘science’ but also critiques tendencies of qualitative researchers to essentialize proponents of ‘science.’ These arguments raise the issue of dialogue across the differences between researchers working in different paradigms” (Maxwell, p. 35, 2004).
Fisher (2003) critically evaluates what he claims is “the often repeated maxim that fields of study are only as scientific as they are mathematical,” an idea which would seem to dismiss any science in qualitative research. While Möller (2003), a sociologist, merely emphasizes the systematic nature of the scientific method in what seems to be a very loose definition of the concept of science: “Science points to the application of systematic methods to obtain knowledge and the knowledge obtained by those methods (Henslin, 1999)…The term scientific research implies that a disciplined method of thinking is followed about social phenomena (e.g., order, change, poverty, etc.) in order to arrive at a better understanding of the world in which live…The term scientific method refers to ‘the building of a body of scientific knowledge through observation, experimentation, generalization, and verification” (Möller, Vurm, and Petr, p. 29-30, 2003).
Still and Dryden (2004) provide welcomed insight, elucidating the conundrum. They identify the philosopher Larry Laudan (1983), who “showed that it is impossible to arrive at a definition of science which will distinguish all scientific from all pseudosicientific or non-scientific statements” (Still & Dryden, 2004, p. 265). Still and Dryden rightly note that despite Laudan’s claim, serious discussions of the problem continue in psychology, psychotherapy, and medicine, however more impassioned than the discussions in the 1980’s, which were dominated by philosophers and sociologists. They link the effort to define science as something distinct from other activities to the goal of granting epistemic authority to science. “Inclusion or exclusion can determine the future of a discipline, and even its survival” (Still & Dryden, 2003, p. 267).
Still and Dryden trace the history of the demarcation effort, and in doing so, distinguish between what they call “two overlapping traditions of big and little pseudoscience” (p. 269). “Little pseudoscience” entails claims and ideas that may have a following for a period of time, but that are seen as bizarre and easily identified as non-scientific in retrospect (e.g., flying saucers, Lysenkoism, Orgonomy, Dianetics,
Still and Dryden attribute the common use of the word “science” and an “implicit, [folk] belief in some form of unity” (p. 270) to the Unity of Science Movement that was associated with the
“The word ‘pseudoscience’ emerged from the
Imre Lakatos (1970), who proposed a theory of scientific research programs, and like Popper, dismissed Marxism and Freudism as pseudosciences since, according to Lakatos, they do not predict new facts or lead to the discovery of new facts, and so are not progressive. Lakatos also questioned the benefit of statistics in the social sciences: he "wonders whether the function of statistical techniques in the social sciences is not primarily to provide a machinery for producing phoney collaboration and thereby a semblance of 'scientific progress' where, in fact, there is nothing but an increase in pseudo-intellectual garbage" (Lakatos, 1970, p. 176, cited by Still & Dryden, 2004, p. 274). Lakatos went as far as recommending legislation to control such "intellectual pollution" (Lakatos, 1970, p. 176).
The physict and philosoper Mario Blunge (1967) characterized pseudoscience as aiming to influence people rather than discovering reality and as lacking a self-correction mechanism. He described the doctrines of pseudoscience as being deficient in grounding in science and untested by experiment proper (Still & Dryden, 2004, p. 274). Still and Dryden note that these criteria are "general enough to include both psychoanalysis and dowsing" (ibid, p. 274).
References
Mandel, S. (1969). Dictionary of science.
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods, 3rd ed.
Still, A. and Dryden, W. (2004). The social psychology of "pseudoscience": A brief history. Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior, 34(3), 266-290.
Berg, given the apparent lack of unity amongst those that we call scientists in defining science, it is not surprising that there would be some disagreement about the nature of Information Science. But, that is not to say that the endeavor to identify the boundaries of what we call science should be dismissed or that the investment is without reward. As Hines (1988), points out
ReplyDelete"...the witch delusion and the Nazi horrors show the great damage done by uncritical acceptance of pseudoscientific claims. Both might well have been avoided if the public had been educated in critical scientific thinking" (Hines, 1988, p. 20, cited by Still & Dryden, 2004, p. 270).
Studies in the history and philosophy of science should enrich our work as researchers and result in more sophisticated styles of argument. The goals underlying verificationism and falsifiability deal with the questions we have all asked ourselves this semester and behore: "What is objective reality?", and very similar to Abbott's investigations into the evolution of knowledge in different disciplines and efforts to control expert knowledge, "How does science progress?" and "What underlies seemingly detached efforts to identify what is essential to science?" Does the goal always involve establishing epistemic authority and disciplinary jurisdiction?
"...the allegation of 'pseudo-science' is an aspect of the rhetorical and organizational means by which scientists and other sympathetic agents seek to distinguish the domain of science, and to discredit some other activity, in the process of maintaining and extending the statust, cognitive authority, funding, autonomy and other interests and values of those associated with science as an enterprise (Wallis, 1985, p. 593).
If service entails distinguishing between fact and fiction-- (I hesitate to say "truth," which is said to belong to the realms of philosophy and religion)--, how do I as an educator, a middle-manager, or a polilcy-maker, accurately evaluate research? "When is resistance to falsification in the face of disconfirmation consistent with good scientific practice, and when is it the mark of a psudoscience" (Still & Dryden, 2003, p. 273)?
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ReplyDeleteHey Brad! Thank you for posting. I've been looking forward to hearing what you had to say. While I am very much in accord with your flexible, contextualized stance, I hadn't realized that Wittgenstein is/was a linguistic contextualist. I've misplaced by copy of the "Blue and Brown Books" in one of the many unpacked boxes littering my house, but will make a point of looking into that for my paper for Kathy. You're a real resource for me, Brad.
ReplyDeleteI was just looking through "Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers" by David Edmonds and John Eidinow. This reminded me of the vitriolic nature of the online discussion you recounted. I hadn't realized so clearly before that in addition to discussing the philosophical issues, Edmonds and Eidinow focus a large portion of their book on the emotional aspect of the October 25, 1946 debate between Popper and Wittgenstein during the weekly meeting of Cambridge's Moral Science Club. Edmonds and Eidinow reveal a common, underlying emotional motive in some eminent scholars' criticisms of each other--discord resulting in anger and resentment, leading to more criticism of each other's work in the guise of productive scientific skeptisism. Edmonds and Eidinow illuminate the idiosyncratic, human shortcomings of several brilliant philosopher-scientists, and the very real possibility that *some* (not all) combative "academic" criticism is motivated by less than scientific (i.e., marked by objective, intellectual reasoning) interests of scientists, who pride themselves on their commitment to reason.
"Popper's strategy in argument has been decribed by Bryan Magee. Rather than score through indentifying minor faults, Popper would carefully strengthen his opponent's case before demolishing its core point. Meeting him for the first time, Magee was struck by an 'intellectual aggressiveness such as I had never encountered before. Everything was pursued beyond the limits of acceptable conversation...In practice it meant trying to subjugate people. And there was something angry about the energy and intensity with which he made the attempts" (Edmonds & Eidinow, 2002, p. 176).
If the OED definition of "rational" always signifies "sensible, sane, moderate, not...extreme," there seems to be a paradox: reasoning is affected, if not sometimes sublimated, by primitive impulses (i.e, human emotion). But, that position assumes that emotion subverts reason and more fundamentally, that emotion is irrational. According to Antonio Damasio in "Looking for Spinoza" (2003), "There is growing evidence that feelings, along with the appetites and emotions that most often cause them, play a decisive role in social behavior. That is certainly no surprise. Damasio points out that "Although hardly mainstream, the idea that emotions are inherently rational has a long history. Both Aristotle and Spinoza obviously thought that at least some emotions, in the right circumstances, were rational. In a way, so did David Hume and Adam Smith. The contemporary philosophers Ronald de Sousa and Martha Nussbaum also have argued persuasively for the rationality of emotion" (p. 150). Damasio is careful to point out that, "In this context the term rational does not denote explicit logical reasoning but rather an association with actions or ourcomes that are beneficial to the organism exhibiting emotions The recalled emotional signals are not rational in and of themselves, but they promote outcomes that could have been derived rationally. Perhaps a better term to denote this property of emotions is 'reasonable,' as suggested by Stefan Heck" (p. 150). In "Descarte's Error," Damasio explores the importance of emotion in rational behavior.
Edmonds and Eidinow seem to implicitly understand, though that civility, even in the context of impassioned intellectual discussion, preserves functional relationships. As Damasio puts it, "Social conventions and ethical rules may be seen in part as extensions of the basic homeostatic arrangemetns at the level of society and culture. The outcome of applying the rules is the same as the outcome of basic homeostatic devices such as metabolic regulation or appetites: a balance of life to ensure survival and well-being." Damasio goes on to explain Spinoza in terms of biology:
"The biological reality of self-preservation leads to virtue because in our inalienable need to maintain ourselves we must, of necessity, help preserve other selves. If we fail to do so we perish and are thus vilating the foundational principle, and relinquishing the virtue that lies in self-preservation. The secondary foundation of virtue then is the reality of a social structure and the presence of other living organisms in a complex system of interdependence with our own organism. [I realize that perspective has much in common with both Buddhist and HR frames.]...Good actions are those that, while producing good for the individual via teh natural appetites and emotions, do not harm other individuals. The injunction is unequivocal. An action that might be personally beneficial but would harm others is not good because harming others always haunts and eventually harms the individual who causes the harm. Consequently such actions are evil" (pp. 171-172).
A subtitle for this blog might have been, "What is X?" Edmonds and Eidinow write, "Professor John Watkins conceded that Popper was an intellectual bully: 'In seminars there were famous cases where someone announced his title, "What is X?" And Popper would interrupt, '"What" questions are completely wrong, misguided.' And so the speaker got through his title and nothing more" (ibid, 2002, p. 176).
"To treat someone well when he does not like you, you need to be not only very good-natured, but very tactful too." Wittgenstein
References
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain. Orlando: Harcourt, Inc.
Edmonds, D., and Eidinow, J. (2002). Wittgenstein's poker: The story of a ten-minute argument between two great philosophers. NY: Harper Collins.